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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*

I. INTRODUCTION

The General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with wills,
trusts, and estates that added or amended a number of sections of
the Virginia Code in its 2001 Session. In addition, one Supreme
Court of Virginia opinion and three Virginia Circuit Court opinions raised issues of interest to the general practitioner as well as
the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates during the period covered by this review. This article reports on all of these legislative
and judicial developments.'

II. LEGISLATION
A. Decedents'Estates-Notice and Copies of Inventories and
Accountings, and Wills
House Bill 1195, carried over from the 2000 Session, sought to
introduce modest informational provisions into Virginia probate
law in favor of beneficiaries of decedents' estates.2 As amended
and enacted by the 2001 Session,3 this legislation adds section

*

Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,

those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 2001
supplement for the new sections.
2. H.B. 1195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000). This bill is briefly discussed in J.
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 34 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1069, 1080-81 (2000).
3. H.B. 1195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2001,
ch. 265, 2001 Va. Acts 217) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-12.4, -32 (Repl.
Vol. 2001), § 64.1-122.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
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26-12.44 to the Virginia Code to require personal representatives
filing inventories or accounts to mail copies to entitled parties5 on
or before the date these documents are filed with the commissioner of accounts.6 To ensure recipients a minimum amount of
time within which to act upon the requested information, and to
help enforce the notice provision itself, the commissioner is prohibited from approving an inventory or account until twenty-one
days after its receipt and unless the inventory or account: (1)
states that all requested copies were mailed; (2) shows the date of
mailing; and (3) shows the names and mailing addresses of the
addressees.7 To ensure that recipients are informed of the commissioner's actions on an account and to advise them of the time
frame within which they may object, section 26-32 was amended
to require the commissioner of accounts to send a copy of the
commissioner's report and any attachments (except the account
itself) to any entitled parties who make a written request for the
report.' In addition, the commissioner must advise the recipients
that the report will be automatically confirmed by law fifteen
days after its filing with the court unless they file objections.9 Finally, to ensure that interested persons are advised of the foregoing rights, section 64.1-122.2, which deals with notice of probate
and qualification in decedents' estates, was amended to add a
summary statement of these rights to the official form that personal representatives or proponents of wills must send to those
entitled to notice thereunder.1 °
One further aspect of House Bill 1195, as originally introduced

4. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.4 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
5. The parties entitled to such copies are the same persons who are entitled to receive notice of probate, VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001), except for
intestate takers in a fully testate matter and beneficiaries who receive their bequests before the documents are filed with the commissioner of accounts, provided these persons
make a written request to the personal representative for the copies. Id.
6. Id. § 26-12.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). This right to receive also applies to copies of affidavits of intent to file a statement in lieu of an account at a later date and copies of any
documents making changes to previously filed ones. Recipients are not, however, entitled
to copies of any supporting vouchers, and a request does not entitle a person to copies of
filings made before the request is received by the personal representative. Id.
7. Id. § 26-12.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
8. Id. § 26-32 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 64.1-122.2(C)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2001). This amendment also requires the notice
to include the mailing address of the commissioner with whom any required inventory or
account will be filed. Id. § 64.1-122.2(C)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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in the 2000 Session, was a requirement added to section 64.1122.2 that personal representatives automatically send a copy of
any will to everyone entitled to notice thereunder." This provision did not appear in the 2001 version that was initially passed
by the House, 2 but a Senate amendment (later accepted by the
House) added ineffectual language apparently intending to give
those persons entitled to request copies of inventories and accounts the further right to also request a copy of any will. 3 This
drafting error is best understood by first examining the primary
purpose of the legislation-to give entitled parties a right to copies of inventories and accounts. The first step in this process, as
noted above, was the enactment of the new section 26-12.4 to impose a duty upon personal representatives to send such copies
upon request. The second step was an amendment to section
64.1-122.2 to advise persons receiving notice of probate of their
rights to such copies. Unfortunately, the "will-copy" amendment
fails to contain the required first step. Without imposing a duty
upon the personal representative to send a copy, it simply advises
affected parties of their (non-existent) right to receive a copy of
the will from the personal representative. This error should not
cause any immediate problem, however, because the bill applies
only to "estates of persons dying on or after July 1, 2002."' 4 Thus,
remedial action can be taken in the 2002 Session. At such time, it
is respectfully suggested that, instead of cleaning up the "right to
a copy" approach taken by the Senate amendment, the Commonwealth would be better served by going back to the original approach taken in the 2000 Session's version of House Bill 1195.
Under that approach, personal representatives automatically
send a copy of any will to everyone entitled to notice of probate
under section 64.1-122."5
Lastly, it needs to be noted that although the General Assembly has now addressed the due process concerns that have existed
in the probate area for too long, the present legislation leaves
11. H.B. 1195, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
12. H.B. 1195, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2001).
13. The two amendments referring to copies of wills are found in section 64.1122.2(A), which introduces the four categories of persons entitled to notice of probate, and
section 64.1-122.2(C), which states the information to be contained in the notice. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.1-122.2(A), -122.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
14. Va. H.B. 1195 (Reg. Sess. 2001).
15. Va. H.B. 1195 (Reg. Sess. 2000).
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much undone. The General Assembly's failure to impose comparable notice requirements upon testamentary trustees, conservators of incapacitated persons, and guardians of minors perpetuates the long-standing patent unconstitutionality in these areas
of law. 16
B. Non-Probate Transfers-Non-Testamentary
A certain tension has long existed in the law between documents that are clearly inter vivos or clearly testamentary in operation and inter vivos documents containing donative provisions
designed to become effective at one's death. A recent example of
the latter is found in Zink v. Stafford,'" wherein Father sold parcels of real estate to four persons, taking back promissory notes in
three cases that were made to "Father and Daughter or the survivor," and in the fourth case a note made to him individually but
later endorsed over to "Father or Daughter or the survivor." i"
When Daughter claimed these notes upon Father's death, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "the survivorship language on
each note was an abortive testamentary act and not a gift." 9 In
response to the problem presented in Zink and other cases, the
General Assembly, in its 2001 Session, added new section 64.145.3 to legitimatize non-probate transfer at death provisions contained in virtually every inter vivos writing by declaring them to
be non-testamentary." This new section is, mutatis mutandis, a
copy of Section 6-101 of the Uniform Probate Code, whose drafters stated that "[t]he sole purpose of this section is to prevent the
21
transfers authorized here from being treated as testamentary."

16. For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved, see J. Rodney Johnson, The
Absence of Due Process in FiduciaryAccounting: A ConstitutionalConcern,VA. BAR ASS'N
J., Fall 1997, at 11.
17. 257 Va. 46, 509 S.E.2d 833 (1999). For further discussion of Zink, see J. Rodney
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 33 U. RICH. L. REV.
1075, 1097 (1999).
18. Zink, 257 Va. at 49, 509 S.E.2d at 833.
19. Id. at 51, 509 S.E.2d at 836.
20.

VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-45.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001).

21.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 cmt. (amended 1989), 8 U.L.A. 431 (1969).
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AccountsC. JointProperty-Survivorship-Securities'
Presumptionof Convenience
The "presumption of convenience" was a judicial doctrine formerly applied to deposit accounts in financial institutions, pursuant to which a person depositing funds in a financial institution
in the depositor's name and that of another (not the depositor's
spouse), jointly, was presumed to have placed that other's name
on the account solely for the depositor's convenience, i.e., so that
the other might have access to these funds for the depositor's
benefit if the depositor became ill or was otherwise unable to personally attend to the depositor's banking business.2 2 This presumption was repealed when the 1979 Session adopted uniform
multiple party account legislation.23
Unfortunately, the presumption of convenience resurfaced in
the recent case of Buck v. Jordan,' wherein the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that, although the presumption had been repealed vis-a-vis deposit accounts in financial institutions, it was
applicable to investment accounts in investment corporations.
The problem thus created may be illustrated with the following
hypothetical. If Father purchases specific stock and has it titled
"Father and Daughter as joint tenants with the right of survivorship," they will own the stock equally during their joint lifetime,
and Daughter will become the sole owner at Father's death. However, if Father opens an investment account titled in the same
exact language, Father will own the entire account during their
joint lifetime, and it will be an asset of his estate upon his death.
Thus, as a result of Buck, ownership and survivorship rights in
securities cases will be determined by whether the parties elect to
have certificates of stock issued, or have the certificates held in
an investment account-an unsupportable distinction. Accordingly, House Bill 1731 amended section 55-20.1 in order to pre-

22. This doctrine is more fully discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust,
and P.O.D.Accounts: Virginia Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L.
REv. 41 (1973).
23. Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 407, 1979 Va. Acts 596 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16 (Repl. Vol. 1999)). The presumption of convenience in joint
account cases was replaced with a presumption of survivorship by VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1125.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
24. 256 Va. 535, 508 S.E.2d 880 (1998). Though recognized, the presumption was rebutted in this case, which is commented upon in Johnson, supra note 17, at 1095-97.
25. See Buck, 256 Va. at 541-42, 508 S.E.2d at 883.
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vent the presumption of convenience from arising in this, or any,
context in the future. The amendment provided that when any
realty, personalty, or written memorial of a chose in action2 6 is
"titled, registered, or endorsed in the name of two or more persons 'jointly,' as 'joint tenants,' in a 'joint tenancy,' or other similar language," the parties will own the property as joint tenants
without survivorship. However, if "the expression 'with survivorship' or any equivalent language" is added thereto, "it shall be
presumed that such persons are intended to own the property as
joint tenants with the right of survivorship as at common law."27
In addition to this primary purpose, House Bill 1731 further
clarified the law of concurrent estates by moving the language
applicable to tenancies by the entireties formerly found in section
55-20.1, entitled "Joint ownership in real and personal property,"
into a new section 55-20.2, entitled "Tenants by the entireties in
real and personal property; certain trusts."2' Finally, House Bill
1731 also amended section 55-21, which deals with exceptions to
section 55-20, to provide that its provisions are applicable to all
fiduciaries, instead of only executors and trustees, and promis-

26. The term "written memorial of a chose in action" was added to the statute because
of certain language in Pitts v. United States, 242 Va. 254, 408 S.E.2d 901 (1991), a case
concerned with survivorship rights under section 55-21 "'when it manifestly appears from
the tenor of the instrument' creating the tenancy that survivorship was intended to be an
attribute of the estate." Id. at 260, 408 S.E.2d at 904 (citation omitted). The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that section 55-21 "intended to apply to joint tenancies and to tenancies by the entireties created by an 'instrument' of conveyance or devise. The promissory
notes executed by the partnership are not such instruments. They did not create a tenancy
by the entirety; they are memorials of a chose in action." Id. Thus, in order to ensure that
the presumption of convenience would not be resurrected in the context of promissory
notes, the 2001 Session added the term "written memorial of a chose in action" at this
point in section 55-20.1 and inserted "memorializing the existence of' in section 55-21's
opening sentence, viz., "[s]ection 55-20 shall not apply to any estate which joint tenants
have as fiduciaries, nor to any real or personal property transferred to persons in their
own right when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument transferring such
property, or memorializing the existence of a chose in action." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21
(Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001). This amendment further provided
that "[tihis section is not applicable to multiple party accounts under §§ 6.1-125.1 through
6.1-125.16, or to any other matter specifically governed by another provision of this code."
Id.
28. Id. § 55-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). To complete this clarification, this legislation also
moved the last sentence of Virginia Code section 55-21, also dealing with tenancies by the
entirety, into new Virginia Code section 55-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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sory notes that only memorialize a chose in action instead of creating property.2 9
D. Testamentary Trusts-WaivingAccounts-Inventories
The General Assembly, in its 1993 Session, added section
26-17.7 to Virginia probate law in order to permit a testator to
expressly waive the statutory obligation of a testamentary trustee
to account before the commissioner of accounts. ° The primary
purpose of House Bill 1733,"' enacted by the 2001 Session, was to
amend section 26-12 to provide that, if a testator waives the requirement to account, the trustee "shall be exempted from the
duty to file an inventory for so long as there remains no duty to
file annual accounts."32
In addition, House Bill 1733 also amended the section dealing
with account waiver in a most unusual manner. As originally enacted, subsection 26-17.7(A) (hereafter "A") of the 1993 legislation
regulated waiver of accounts for wills probated after June 30,
1993, 3 and subsection 26-17.7(D) (hereafter "D") regulated
waiver of accounts for wills probated prior to July 1, 1993. 3 ' For a
testator's waiver to be effective under A, the trustee must give
certain notices and information to entitled beneficiaries within
ninety days of qualification and make annual accounts to any of
these beneficiaries that request them.35 For the testator's waiver
to be effective under D, the trustee need only obtain written consent from the entitled beneficiaries." A rather obvious problem

29. Id. § 55-21 (Curn. Supp. 2001). See supranote 26, for a discussion of the concept of
"memorializing a chose in action."

30. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, 1993 Va. Acts 969 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol. 1997)). A provision also allowed for waiver of the obligation to
account in testamentary trusts created before the effective date of this legislation if the
will contained a waiver provision, and all adult beneficiaries who may be entitled to receive principal or income from the trust consent thereto. See J. Rodney Johnson, Annual
Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 833, 840-41
(1993).
31. H.B. 1733, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 8, 2001,
ch. 73, 2001 Va. Acts 48) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol.
2001)).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
33. Id. § 26-17.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
34. Id. § 26-17.7(D) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
35. Id. § 26-17.7(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
36. Id. § 26-17.7(D) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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arose in a certain number of post-June 30, 1993 trusts governed
by A when the trustees, upon first consulting counsel some
months following their qualification, were informed that the testator's waiver provision could not be honored because the trustee
had failed to give the required notices and information within
ninety days as mandated by A. In response to this problem,
House Bill 1733 amended D in a manner that transforms the
failure to comply with the ninety-day notice requirements of A
from a fatal to a relatively inconsequential matter. This transformation was accomplished by replacing the requirement in D
that wills governed by D be probated "prior to July 1, 1993" with
"whenever probated," and then generally (though not exactly) importing the notice and information requirements of A into D. 7
The practical effect of this amendment was to allow the trustee
of a post-June 30, 1993 trust, who unwittingly (or intentionally)
failed to comply with A, to nevertheless qualify for waiver under
subsection D, which now substitutes the entitled beneficiaries'
consents for the former ninety-day notice requirement. Thus, the
trustee who is aware of the ninety-day rule may now decide to ignore it and qualify under D which, unlike A, has no further provision requiring the trustee to make annual accounts to any of the
entitled beneficiaries that request them. Although the goal of this
legislation does not seem unreasonable, one wonders why this bit
of statutory legerdemain was employed to reach it. If the ninetyday rule was proving too harsh, why not address it directly by an
appropriate amendment to A-instead of permitting the avoidance of A by an amendment to D? 3' Lastly, House Bill 1733 also
made two relatively minor amendments to subsections 26-17.7(A)
and (C) dealing with the waiver of accounts.

37. Id.
38. While commenting upon the drafting in this portion of the bill, it should also be
noted that the amendments to subsection D gratuitously inserted "an inventory or" in its
opening sentence, which now reads "Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, any
trustee under a will of a decedent containing the requisite waiver, whenever probated,
shall be relieved of the duty to file an inventory or annual accounts... ." Id. No reference
to waiver of inventory should be made in a section whose title talks only about waiver of
accounts and, most importantly, such language is absolutely unnecessary. The amendments to section 26-12 already provided that trustees who do not have to account under
section 26-17.7 do not have to file an inventory. Id. § 26-12(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
39. These two changes are: (1) The class entitled to the required written notices in
§ 26-17.7(A) was changed from adults "who may then be entitled to receive income or principal from the trust," to adults "other than the trustee... to whom income or principal of
the trust could be currently distributed," and (2) the provision in § 26-17.7(C) permitting
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E. PersonalRepresentatives-Settlementof Accounts-Statement
in Lieu
Although the general rule of Virginia probate law contemplates
that personal representatives of decedents' estates will file periodic accounts, ° section 26-20.1 provides that if all distributees of
an intestate estate or residuary beneficiaries under a will are also
personal representatives, they may file a statement in lieu of
making the required account.4 The required provision in this
statement, that the estate has been distributed "after the time
required by law," has been somewhat troublesome throughout
this section's history because there is no such "time required by
law" in any of the laws of the Commonwealth. The first of the
2001 amendments to this section ended this uncertainty by replacing the ambiguous phrase with "six months have elapsed
since the personal representatives qualified in the clerk's office."43
Another question has been whether a personal representative
that is a residuary beneficiary and who is also the trustee of a
trust was meant to have the benefit of this section; that question
was given a negative answer by the second amendment.'
Another concern developed from this section, which provided
that a personal representative who was not able to make the required statement by the time an account was due might simply
file a notice with the commissioner that the required statement
45
"will be filed when all requisites of this section have been met."
As there was no limit on the number of such notices that might be
filed, a number of years might pass before any estate paperwork

beneficiaries to demand that an account be filed notwithstanding a testator's waiver, was
enlarged to permit such a demand notwithstanding a beneficiary's prior consent to waiver.
Id. §§ 26-17.7(A), (C) (Rep. Vol. 2001).
40. Id. § 26-17.5 (RepI. Vol. 2001).
41. This statute requires that this statement recite "under oath that all known
charges against the estate have been paid, and that after the time required by law, the
residue of the estate has been delivered to the distributees or beneficiaries." Id. § 26-20.1
(Cure. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment).
42. However, the Attorney General has opined that '"After the time required by law'
refers to a period determined reasonable by the commissioner of accounts in light of general law governing creditors' rights and the particular circumstances of the case." 1983-84
op. Va. Att'y Gen. 474.
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-20.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
44. "For the purposes of this section, the term 'residuary beneficiary' shall not include
the trustee of a trust that receives a residuary gift under a decedent's will." Id.
45. Id. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment)
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arrived in the commissioner's office, thereby increasing the opportunity for accidental or intended wrongs to be left undetected. Accordingly, the third amendment required personal representatives filing a notice of intent to file a statement at a later time to
include therein "an explanation of why such a statement cannot
presently be filed," and it also authorized the commissioner to require the filing of an interim account if the commissioner determines that the proffered explanation is not sufficient.46 The
fourth amendment authorized the commissioner to charge a $75
fee for examining a notice of intent to file a statement, which is
the same amount allowed for examining the statement itself.
F. Spendthrift Trusts-CeilingRemoved-Child Support
Exception
The ceiling on the amount that may be held in a spendthrift
trust, thereby immune from most claims of a beneficiary's creditors, and which was increased from $600,000 to $1,000,000 just
three years ago,48 was completely removed by the 2001 Session.49
However, this same legislation also provided that "no such
[spendthrift] condition shall operate to the prejudice of a judgment against a beneficiary for the support of the beneficiary's
child." o
G. Non-ProbatePayments-Adjustments
Over the years, the General Assembly enacted numerous probate-related statutes that contain references to specific dollar
amounts. It is the destiny of any such statute to decline in significance as inflation decreases the actual value of the specified
amount. Responding to this problem, as well as providing a certain upgrading of these statutes, the General Assembly increased
the amounts in a number of these statutes. 51

46.
47.
48.
ANN. §

Id. § 26-20.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
Id. § 26-20.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
Act of Apr. 2, 1998, ch. 214, 1998 Va. Acts 329 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
55-19 (Cum. Supp. 2000)).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
50. Id.
51. Although inflationary adjustment was one argument behind these increases, all
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1. Probate Avoidance-Small Estates
The Virginia Code contains a number of statutes designed to
facilitate the transfer of specific kinds of property from the dead
to the living without requiring the recipients to go through the
probate process. These statutes are permissive in nature and, although they fully protect the transferor who elects to rely upon
them, a potential transferee cannot force their use. A further
common denominator in most of these statutes has been a requirement that the value of the property in question not exceed
$10,000. This ceiling has been increased to $15,000 in the following instances: (1) certain sums due decedents from the Commonwealth, the United States, labor unions or employers;52 (2) corporate securities owned by the decedent;53 (3) sums due deceased
trust or estate beneficiaries;54 (4) sums due deceased inmates of
state mental institutions;55 (5) sums due deceased patients of
municipally operated health care facilities;56 and (6) personal
property belonging to nonresident decedents."
2.

Small Estates Act

The Virginia Small Estate Act5 has provided for an affidavitbased personal property collection process in estates where the
value of the entire personal probate estate does not exceed
$10,000." The 2001 legislation increased this ceiling to $15,000.60

but two of these sections were increased from $5,000 to $10,000 in 1996 and, while Virginia has not experienced 50% inflation since that time, these same sections are now increased to $15,000. The 1996 increases are discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1249, 1254-56 (1997).
The discussion in the following text is taken from this source, with appropriate modifications, but without traditional attribution.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
53. Id. § 64.1-123.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
54. Id. § 64.1-123.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
55. Id. § 64.1-124 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
56. Id. § 64.1-124.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
57. Id. § 64.1-130 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
58. Id. §§ 64.1-132.1 to -132.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001). For a discussion
of this Act as originally enacted, see J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 68 VA.
L. REV. 521, 529-30 (1982).
59. Id. § 64.1-132.2 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
60. Id. § 64.1-132.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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3. Homestead, Exempt Property, and Living Allowance
The General Assembly, in its 1981 Session, enacted comprehensive legislation governing the rights of a decedent's spouse
and children to exempt property and allowances.6' The 2001
amendments increased the homestead allowance from $10,000 to
$15,000,62 the exempt property allowance from $10,000 to
$15,000,63 and the personal representative's authority to award a
living allowance from $12,000 to $18,000 if payment is made as a
lump sum, and from $1,000 to $1,500 monthly for one year if
payment is made on a periodic basis." It should be noted that the
living allowance amount is not a limitation upon the amount of
this entitlement, which remains a "reasonable allowance," 5 but
only a limitation upon what can be disbursed without court approval.66
H. Incorporationby Reference-QuestionableLegislation
Generally speaking, the common law term "incorporation by
reference" refers to "[a] method of making a secondary document
part of a primary document by including in the primary document
a statement that the secondary document should be treated as if
it were contained with the primary one." Virginia common law
imposes the following three conditions upon the employment of
this concept:
(1) the document [to be incorporated] must be a paper in actual existence at the time of the execution of the will; (2) it must appear from
the face of the will that it is a paper in actual existence; and (3) it
must68 be identified and described with reasonable certainty in the
will.

61. Act of Mar. 22, 1981, ch. 580, 1981 Va. Acts 897 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.1-151.1 to -151.6 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001)). For a discussion of this Act
and its background, see J. Rodney Johnson, Support of the Surviving Spouse and Minor
Children in Virginia: ProposedLegislation v. Present Law, 14 U. RicH. L. REV. 639, 64652 (1980)), and Johnson, supra note 58, at 521-25.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.3 (Cum.Supp. 2001).
63. Id. § 64.1-151.2 (Cum.Supp. 2001).
64. Id. § 64.1-151.4 (Cum.Supp. 2001).
65. Id. § 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
66. Id. § 64.1-151.4 (Cum.Supp. 2001).
67. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 770 (7th ed. 1999).
68. Thrasher v. Thrasher, 202 Va. 594, 603, 118 S.E.2d 820, 825 (1961) (citing Law-
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In Virginia there is one statutory exception to the requirements of
this doctrine,6 9 and two superficially similar but different matters
that need to be distinguished therefrom." Against this background, a number of questions arise in connection with the General Assembly's enactment of section 64.1-45.2."'

less v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 518, 47 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1948)). Although these cases refer to
outside papers to be incorporated in wills, there is no reason to believe that the rules
would be any different if the recipient paper was something other than a will.
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (listing boilerplate fiduciary powers that may be wholly or partially incorporated into a trust or will by reference thereto).
Whereas the common law rule permits only presently existing writings to be incorporated
into another, this section provides that "unless the will or trust instrument expresses a
contrary intention, the incorporation by reference of powers enumerated by this statute
shall refer to those powers existing at the time of death." Id. § 64.1-57(4) (Cum. Supp.
2001).
70. In 1995 the General Assembly added section 64.145.1 to the Virginia Code, which
legitimated the concept of a testator's post-will list to dispose of items of tangible personal
property, and declared that "except as provided herein, [this section] shall not otherwise
affect the law of incorporation by reference." Id. § 64.1-45.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp.
2001). Notwithstanding the General Assembly's mention of "incorporation by reference" in
this statute, it does not involve this concept for a rather obvious reason. Under any definition of the incorporation doctrine, the writing to which reference is made becomes a part of
the paper making the reference. However, the list authorized by section 64.1-45.1 does not
become a part of the testator's will and it is not admitted to probate in the clerk's office,
but a copy must be furnished to the commissioner of accounts during the accounting process. Id. A discussion of this list can be found in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1175, 1185-86 (1995). In 1997
the General Assembly extended a similar, but somewhat restricted, privilege to settlors of
inter vivos trusts. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001); see also Johnson, supra note
51, at 1264-65.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-45.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). This section, entitled "Incorporation by reference; letter of instruction or memorandum into a will, power of attorney or
trust instrument," states:
A. The following original documents may be incorporated by reference into a
will, power of attorney or trust instrument:
1. A letter or memorandum to the fiduciary or agent as to the interpretation
of discretionary powers of distribution where the will, power of attorney or
trust instrument provides the fiduciary or agent the power to make distributions to beneficiaries in the discretion of the fiduciary or agent; and
2. A letter or memorandum stating the views or directions of the maker of
the will, power of attorney or trust instrument as to the exercise of discretion
by the fiduciary or agent in making health care decisions for the maker.
B. No provision in the original document sought to be incorporated by reference under this section that contradicts or is inconsistent with a provision of
the incorporating will, power of attorney or trust instrument shall be enforced.
C. This section shall not prevent the incorporation by reference of any writing
into any other writing that would otherwise be effective under § 64.1-45.1 or
under any other law of incorporation by reference.
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In summary, this puzzling statute appears to provide for the incorporation into wills, powers of attorney, and trust instruments
of (1) "original documents," (2) that "may be prepared before or
after" the execution of the incorporating document, and (3) that
have been "signed and notarized," if the original documents relate
to either "the interpretation of discretionary powers of distribution," or the maker's views or directions "as to the exercise of discretion by the fiduciary or agent in making health care decisions. " " The primary question to be posed is "Why was this
statute enacted?" Privacy cannot be a goal because an incorporated document becomes a part of the original and thus, anyone
entitled to a copy of the primary document would be entitled to a
copy of anything incorporated therein. Legal efficacy cannot be a
goal because, although incorporation by reference can be very
helpful in some cases, knowledgeable estate planners would agree
that if a decision regarding a fiduciary's exercise of discretion is
made before the primary document is executed it should be stated
therein, and if such a decision (or a contrary one) is made thereafter, it should be expressed in a new will, power of attorney, or
trust agreement.7 3 For obvious reasons, simplicity, economy and
convenience cannot be goals. 4 The one possible goal that can be
envisioned is the creation of a mechanism for retaining a certain
amount of control over distributions from an irrevocable inter vivos trust by a post-execution "letter or memorandum to the fiduciary ... as to the interpretation of discretionary powers of distribution." 75 However, an irrevocable trust is typically utilized only

D. The documents referenced in subsection A shall be signed and notarized,
and may be prepared before or after the execution of the will, power of attorney or trust instrument.
Id.
72. Id.
73. The problem of contradictions and inconsistencies between original and recipient
documents is recognized in Virginia Code section 64.1-45.2(B). See id. § 64.1-45.2(B) (Cum.
Supp. 2001) (addressing contradiction). However, the easiest way to avoid the problem of
reconciling conflicting documents, which occurs far too often, is to have only one document.
Moreover, the one-document approach not only reduces the likelihood of litigation, but it
also increases the likelihood that the client's goals will be accomplished.
74. Once upon a time, when preparation of new documents was the laborious quill-pen
task of scriveners, a genuine case could be made for codicils to wills and amendments to
other lengthy documents. These considerations are absent in today's highly automated
word-processing environment and thus, except in unusual cases, the knowledgeable estate
planner finds it easier, faster, and better to execute a new document instead of attempting
to modify an existing one.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-45.2(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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when the settlor is seeking income and/or estate tax advantages,
and it is clear that in such cases the settlor's possession of a
power to control a trustee's discretionary distribution power will
result in the loss of any income or estate tax benefit otherwise
available to an irrevocable inter vivos trust. 6
In addition to the primary "why" question discussed above, a
non-exclusive list of other concerns raised by this statute includes
the following: (1) How does one employ this concept? The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated how the common law rule is
employed, the statutory fiduciary-power exception states how it is
employed, the analogous but different statutes dealing with disposition of tangible personal property at death state how they are
employed, but the present statute is silent; (2) Why is the term
"original documents" used, and what happens if no original
document is found but a copy is?; (3) Why does this statute provide for incorporating letters or memoranda relating to health
care decisions into a trust or will, neither of which relate to such
matters and the latter of which does not become a legal document
until after the testator has died and health care decisions can no
longer be made?; (4) Why does this statute expressly state that
instruments effective under section 64.1-45.1 shall not be negatively affected by its provisions, but make no similar statement
about the spiritual twin of section 64.1-45.1, section 55-7.2?; and
(5) Why, if there is any good purpose to be served by this statute,
will an intended incorporation thereunder fail if the original
document sought to be incorporated is not notarized, notwithstanding uncontradicted evidence of its authenticity? Giving such
obeisance to a largely meaningless formality is totally out of step
with reason and reality.
In short, there appears to be only one good thing that can be
said of this statute. It expressly states that "[tihis section shall
not prevent the incorporation by reference of any writing into any
other writing that would otherwise be effective under... any
other law of incorporation by reference."" Thus, notwithstanding
the problems presented by this statute, the Virginia lawyer may
continue to use and rely upon the settled rules of prior law in all
non-tax matters. However, because of the possible loss of income

76. See I.R.C. § 674(a) (1994), as to income tax, and I.R.C. § 2038 (1994), as to estate
tax.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-45.2(C) (Curn. Supp. 2001).
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and estate tax advantages associated with irrevocable inter vivos
trusts, the prudent estate planner may wish to include a provision expressly renouncing this new incorporation power in any
post-June 30, 2001, irrevocable trust instruments, and to suggest
to clients who created irrevocable trusts prior to July 1, 2001,
that they execute an instrument disclaiming or renouncing their
after-the-fact acquisition of this power under the 2001 legislation.
Taking all of this section's problems into account, in light of its
failure to accomplish any purpose, it is submitted that the General Assembly, in its 2002 Session, should repeal, rather than attempt to redraft, this statute.
I. CertainSmall Estates-Waiverof Inventory and Settlement
Section 26-12.3, designed to facilitate the probate process in
small estates, has provided that "[w]hen an estate does not exceed $10,000 in value, and an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose
claim exceeds the value of the estate seeks qualification, the clerk
shall waive inventory under § 26-12 and settlement under
§ 26-17. " " The 2001 amendments to this section changed "an estate" to "a personal estate under the supervision and control of
the personal representative or curator," and added the further requirement that "the personal representative or curator does not
have the power of sale over real estate."79
The initial portion of the first amendment, changing "an estate" to a "personal estate" not exceeding $10,000, standing alone,
would extend this section's operation because it would eliminate
the value of any real estate from the computation. However, the
complete language of the first amendment, "a personal estate under the supervision and control of the personal representative or
curator, " raises a major issue regarding the continuing viability

78. Id. § 26-12.3 (Cum.Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment).
79. As amended, the statute reads as follows:
When (i) a personal estate under the supervision and control of the personal
representative or curator does not exceed $10,000 in value, (ii) the personal
representative or curator does not have the power of sale over real estate, and
(iii) an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose claim exceeds the value of the estate seeks qualification, the clerk shall waive inventory under § 26-12 and
settlement under § 26-17.
Id. § 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
80. Id.
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of this section's relief provisions because, if there is already a personal representative in existence under clause (i), why would another person be seeking qualification under clause (iii)? Moreover,
even if another should seek qualification in such a case, the clerk
does not have the power to make such an appointment,"' so why
state that "the clerk shall waive" inventory and settlement upon
making the appointment that the clerk does not have the authority to make? 2 The further requirement added by the second
amendment, that "the personal representative or curator does not
have the power of sale over real estate," 3 adds to the confusion
regarding this legislation because curators do not have a power of
sale over real estate' and an administrator would have that
power only if granted by the circuit court.8" In addition, the first

amendment's change of "an estate" to "a personal estate" creates
an ambiguity regarding the meaning of "the estate" in clause
(iii), and clause (iii) also refers to a non-existent "§ 26-17."

7

Be-

cause of the uncertainties surrounding the application of this legislation, it needs to be readdressed during the 2002 Session of the
General Assembly.

81. In Bolling v. D'Amato, 259 Va. 299, 526 S.E.2d 257 (2000), the court referred to
the "ancient and settled rule" that "when an administrator had been appointed and qualified, 'the power of the court or clerk is exhausted, and no further appointment can be made
until a vacancy occurs in the office in some way recognized by law.'" Id. at 304, 526 S.E.2d
at 259 (quoting Beavers v. Beavers, 185 Va. 418, 423, 39 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1946)).
82. Of course, the court or clerk has the power to appoint an executor under a will
that has been brought forward after the qualification of an administrator on an estate believed to be intestate, but the remedy of the section in question is aimed at the qualification of"an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose claim exceeds the value of the estate." Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 64.1-77 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
84. The curator's role, however, is broader than that of an administrator because, although the latter has no control over a decedent's real property by virtue of office, a curator "may lease or receive the rents and profits of any real estate whereof the decedent or
testator may have died seized or possessed." Id. § 64.1-93 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
85. Section 64.1-57.1 empowers the circuit court to grant "all or a part of such powers
as may be incorporated by reference pursuant to § 64.1-57." Id. § 64.1-57.1 (Cum.Supp.
2001). One of these fiduciary powers is the power to sell real estate. Id. § 64.1-57(1)(b)
(Cum. Supp. 2001).
86. For example, when clause (iii) refers to "an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose
claim exceeds the value of the estate," it is unclear whether "the estate" means the entire
estate or only the personal estate. Id. § 26-12.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001) (emphasis added).
87. This section's reference to § 26-17 has been incorrect since the latter was repealed
in 1993. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 689, § 2, 1993 Va. Acts 969. The correct reference is VA.
CODE ANN. § 26-17.5 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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J. Small Estates-Waiverof Surety
The general rule of section 26-4 allows a court or its clerk to
waive surety upon the official bond of a personal representative,
guardian, conservator or committee if the amount coming under
the fiduciary's control does not exceed $10,000.8 However, when
the General Assembly, in its 1983 Session, amended section 26-59
to allow certain nonresidents to qualify as personal representatives, it stipulated that bond with surety would be required "in
every case ... unless a resident personal representative ... qualifies at the same time." 9 It was believed important to have a
surety on the bond of every nonresident acting as sole fiduciary in
order that the commissioner of accounts and estate beneficiaries
might have some leverage or control over these persons once they
left the Commonwealth, taking estate assets with them. Thus,
the "in every case" language of the 1983 legislation was intended
to preclude the application of the small-estate waiver provision of
section 26-4 to cases involving nonresident fiduciaries serving
without a Virginia co-fiduciary. As time passed, and the General
Assembly became more comfortable with the concept of nonresident fiduciaries serving alone, it partially relaxed the requirement of section 26-59 by permitting the circuit court to waive
surety upon fiduciary bonds in accordance with the small estate
provision of section 26-4.9" However, it refrained from extending
this power to clerks of court.
In the 2001 Session, the General Assembly amended section
26-59 to extend this power to clerks of court. This amendment
was contained in a lengthy omnibus bill, the official summary of
which opens by stating that it "[m]akes technical corrections... that are not intended to create any substantive changes
in policy."9 ' In regard to the specific amendment in question, the
same source states that "an unintended conflict between the section relating to nonresident fiduciaries and a section relating to
the qualification of a fiduciary without security is eliminated by

88. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-4 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
89. Act of Mar. 27, 1983, ch. 467, 1983 Va. Acts 605 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-59(B) (Repl. Vol. 1985)).
90. Act of Apr. 6, 1996, ch. 680, 1996 Va. Acts 1179 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59
(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
91. S.B. 891, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Apr. 5, 2001, ch.
836, 2001 Va. Acts 1173) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59 (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
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clarifring that the clerk may waive the surety when he appoints.9 2 It is submitted, however, that the change in question
was substantive as opposed to technical and that the difference it
eliminated was not "an unintended conflict."
K. Wrongful Death or PersonalInjury-Action Against Resident
orNonresident
Section 64.1-75.1 provided that when a nonresident sought to
be sued for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of acts
occurring in Virginia has died, "an administrator of such person
may be appointed [in Virginia], solely for the purpose of prosecution of said suit."9 3 In the 2001 Session, the General Assembly
first broadened the applicability of this section by also making its
remedy applicable to actions against estates of deceased residents.9 4 But then it restricted the section's applicability by limiting it to a suit against a decedent "for whose estate an executor
has not been appointed." 5 It is difficult to believe that this legislation was intended to require a Virginia plaintiff to prosecute a
Virginia-origin suit against a deceased nonresident defendant in
the nonresident's jurisdiction simply because an executor has
been appointed there, but such is the literal language of the statute. Similarly, it is difficult to believe that this legislation was intended to allow the appointment of an administrator "solely for
the purpose of prosecution of' these suits even if a Virginia administrator has already been appointed for a Virginia decedent's
estate, but again such is the literal language of the statute. 96 It is

92. Id.
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-75.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (prior to amendment).
94. Id. § 64.1-75.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
95. Id.
96. The statute allows the appointment of this administrator "for the sole purpose" of
suit except when an executor has been appointed. It is possible that this legislation was
meant as a response to Bolling v. DAmato, 259 Va. 299, 526 S.E.2d 257 (2000), where one
interpretation of the Court's decision suggested that a practice might have developed of
appointing administrators "for the sole purpose" of suit even though the clerk had already
appointed an administrator, notwithstanding any legal justification for such an appointment. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1088. However, if the purpose of the legislation was to
legitimate the appointment of an administrator "for the sole purpose" of suit when an administrator of the estate had already been appointed, it is difficult to see why such a possibility would not also be legitimated if the personal representative already qualified on
the decedent's estate happened to be an executor instead of an administrator.
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submitted that this legislation needs to be readdressed and clarified in the 2002 Session.
L. PersonalRepresentatives-Suits by or Against
Section 64.1-144, the entire text of which provided that "[a]
personal representative may sue or be sued upon any judgment
for or against or any contract of or with his decedent,"9" was
amended by adding the following language to its end: "including,
but not limited to, suits for personal injury or wrongful death."8
It is not clear why this amendment was believed to be necessary
but, if it was, logic would suggest that provision should also be
made for tort actions where neither personal injury nor death is
involved. Thus, this legislation needs to be added to the list of
2001 enactments requiring further action in the 2002 Session.
M. FiduciaryBonds-Execution by Agent
Section 26-3, dealing with fiduciary bonds, provided that any
fiduciary required to post additional bond or a new bond must
personally appear before the court or clerk to make the required
oath and sign the necessary paperwork.99 This procedure has become more inconvenient since Virginia relaxed its fiduciary qualification laws and increasing numbers of non-Virginians have begun serving in a variety of fiduciary capacities. In response to the
travel, time, and expense problems presented by requiring a fiduciary's personal appearance in bond matters, the General Assembly amended section 26-3 to authorize "the fiduciary's execution
[of a new, additional, or reduction in, bond] to be made by the fiduciary's agent under a power of attorney expressly authorizing
the same." 00

97. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-144 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (prior to amendment).
98. Id. § 64.1-144 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
99. Id. § 26-3 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (prior to amendment).
100. Id. § 26-3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001). This legislation also made clarifying changes to VA.
CODE ANN. § 26-3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
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N. Commissioners of Accounts-Duties of Assistant
Commissioners
Section 26-10, dealing with the appointment, duties, and powers of assistant commissioners, has been somewhat ambiguous in
regard to those duties and powers. This ambiguity is eliminated
by the 2001 amendment, which provided that "[o]n all qualifications after June 30, 2001, assistant commissioners of accounts
shall act only in such cases as the commissioner of accounts delegates to him."'0 '
0. Trusts-Trustee Hiatus-Who to Execute
Section 26-51 deals with who is to execute a trust in a variety
of circumstances, such as when a trustee dies, resigns, becomes
incapacitated, or is confined, and a replacement has not yet been
appointed. °2 This section was rewritten by the General Assembly
to clarify its operation and to make it grammatically correct.' °3 No
substantive changes were made.0 4
P. Notice of Probate-Affidavitof No Notice Required
The General Assembly, in its 1993 Session, created section
64.1-122.2 to provide for a form of after-the-fact notice of probate
to interested parties in response to a concern that Virginia's ex
parte probate process did not comply with the minimum notice
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.0 5 To ensure compliance, this section requires the party charged with giving notice
thereunder to file an affidavit in the clerk's office "stating the
names and addresses of the persons to whom he has mailed or delivered notice and when the notice was mailed or delivered to
each, " °6 and prohibits the commissioner of accounts from approv-

101. Id. § 26-10 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
102. Id. § 26-51 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment).
103. Compare id. § 26-51 (Repl. Vol. 2001), with id. § 26-51 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
104. Id. § 26-51 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
105. Act of Feb. 9, 1993, ch. 4, 1993 Va. Acts 3 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2
(Repl. Vol. 1995)); see also Johnson, supranote 30, at 833-35.
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2(F) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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ing an account until this affidavit has been filed. °7 A minor problem has developed under this compliance provision in those cases
where notice is not required to be given to anyone. In such cases
an affidavit that notice was given cannot be filed and, in the absence of such an affidavit, some commissioners would not approve
an account. To resolve this impasse, the General Assembly
amended the compliance provision to require either the filing of
the affidavit of notice given or an affidavit "that the name and
address of the person to whom notice is required" cannot be
found.'
Q. Wills-Recordation-CertifiedCopy
Section 64.1-94, addressing the recordation of wills, was
amended to clarify that a "duly certified copy" of a will includes a
copy "prepared from [a] microfilmed or electronic record and certified as authentic by the clerk or his designee."0 9
R. CharitableTrusts-CharitableCorporationsas Trustees
Although Virginia law prohibits any legal entity from engaging
in the trust business without a certificate of authority from the
State Corporation Commission,"' anecdotal evidence presented
during the 2001 Session indicated that some schools and other
charitable entities were in fact serving as trustees of their own
pooled income funds and split-interest trusts in which they were
one of the beneficiaries. Seeing no harm in such a practice, the
General Assembly amended section 6.1-32.12,1" dealing with exemptions to the general prohibition, by adding language that
"[c]larifies and validates the existing practice."" 2

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
as Act

Id.
Id.
Id. § 64.1-94 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
Id. § 6.1-32.13 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
Id. § 6.1-32.12(7) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
H.B. 1730, Summary as introduced, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted
of Mar. 26, 2001, ch. 717, 2001 Va. Acts 968).
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S. InternationalWills-Registry System
In 1995, the General Assembly enacted the Uniform International Wills Act."' In the 2001 Session, the General Assembly
made a ministerial amendment to the section dealing with Virginia's registry system for international wills by changing the
term "Secretary of State" (an office that does not exist in Virginia), to "Secretary of the Commonwealth."'
T. Intestate Succession-Appointment of AdministratorPriorities
The basic rule of section 64.1-118 has been to give a surviving
spouse the first priority in qualifying on a decedent's intestate estate and, in the absence of a spouse who wishes and is able to
qualify, to allow administration to be granted to "such of the others entitled to distribution as the court or clerk shall see fit."" 5
This latter provision has resulted in what some have referred to
as a "race to the courthouse" that has led to undesirable results in
some cases. Accordingly, House Bill 1732 was introduced to
eliminate the race aspect of this statute." 6 However, notwithstanding the General Assembly's passage of this bill, a gubernatorial amendment accepted during the 2001 Special Session provided "[that the provisions of this act shall not become effective
unless reenacted by the 2002 Session of the General Assembly
and signed by the Governor. " 1 7 The Governor did not state his
reasons for this amendment; they remain unknown at the time of
this publication.

113. Act of Mar. 20, 1995, ch. 443, 1995 Va. Acts 637 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.1-96.2 to -96.11 (Repl. Vol. 1995)); see UNIF. PROBATE CODE, art. IX,pt. 10, 8 U.L.A.
191 (1995); see also Johnson, supra note 70, at 1190.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-96.11 (Cum Supp. 2001).
115. Id. § 64.1-118 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (prior to amendment).
116. H.B. 1732, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch.
795, 2001 Va. Acts 1084) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-118 (Cum.Supp.
2001)).
117. Act of Apr. 9, 2001, ch. 795, 2001 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-118 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
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III. SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA DECISION

A. Estate Administration-Section64.1-57 Powers-Reliance
The primary issue before the court in Roberts v. Roberts"8 was
"whether Code § 64.1-57(1)(k).. 9 insulates a fiduciary against a
claim of negligence in the preparation and filing of an estate tax
return by an 'agent or professional representative.""'2 Shortly after S qualified as executor on T's estate he determined that this
undertaking was beyond his level of competence and, pursuant to
the above-referenced power incorporated by reference in T's will,
he retained Bank as his agent to provide the necessary expertise
and services in the administration of T's estate.'21 One service
provided by Bank was the preparation of an estate tax return for
T's estate, on which Bank failed to include certain bonds that had
been found in a safe deposit box owned jointly by S and T.'22 S
claimed to own these bonds by way of gifts from T.'23 Although S
signed the return prepared by Bank, S "did not read such return,
expecting same to be correct."'24 Following the settlement of tax
claims based upon the noninclusion of the bonds, estate beneficiaries brought an action against S seeking to recover the amount
their expected inheritances had been reduced because of the additional payments to federal and state tax authorities. 25 The commissioner in chancery to whom the trial court referred this mat118. 260 Va. 660, 536 S.E.2d 714 (2000).
119. When incorporated by reference into a will or trust, or granted to an administrator
in intestacy, this subsection empowers a fiduciary:
To employ and compensate, out of the principal or the income or both as to
the fiduciary shall seem proper, agents, accountants, brokers, attorneys-infact, attorneys-at-law, tax specialists, licensed real estate brokers, licensed
salesmen and other assistants and advisors deemed by the fiduciary needful
for the proper administration of the trust or estate, and to do so without liability for any neglect, omission, misconduct, or default of any such agent or
professional representative provided he was selected and retained with reasonable care.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(1)(k) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
120. Roberts, 260 Va. at 662, 536 S.E.2d at 715.
121. Id. at 663, 536 S.E.2d at 716.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 664, 536 S.E.2d at 716.
124. Id. at 669, 536 S.E.2d at 719.
125. A secondary issue in this case focused on S's alleged negligence in failing to sue
Bank to recover this amount for the estate. See id. at 666, 670, 536 S.E.2d at 719-20. The
trial court's affirmative response was reversed. See id. at 670, 536 S.E.2d at 720.
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ter found that S selected and relied upon [Bank] because of its
expertise and that S "fully informed [Bank] of the facts necessary
to prepare the tax return for the estate."126 Nevertheless, the
commissioner reported, and the trial court held, that S owed T's
estate a duty to review the tax return in detail and that S "did not
care and skill' when he blindly relied upon"
use 'reasonable
127
Bank.
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in reversing the trial
court, noted that "Code § 64.1-57(1)(k) would be rendered meaningless if a fiduciary could hire an agent whose expertise is essential to managing an estate or trust and then be held liable for relying on the expertise provided by that agent." 1 28 The court's
review of the evidence disclosed no negligence on S's part in selecting or retaining Bank as his agent, and it concluded that
"[h]is reliance upon the bank's work was not 'blind'; rather, it reflected the sort of reliance anticipated by Code § 64.1-57(1)(k),
does not have
which contemplates the situation where a fiduciary
29
himself."
function
this
perform
to
the ability
IV. VIRGINIA CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS

A. Augmented Estate-Exclusions-Giftsto Decedent-Proceeds
The issue before the court in In re Estate of Seitz 3 ° was
whether a certain farm purchased by a testatrix and owned at her
death should be included in her augmented estate. 3 ' Testatrix's
executor and children claimed they might be able to establish at
trial that the funds used by Testatrix to purchase the farm were
received by gift or inheritance from her former husband.'3 2 However, on a motion in limine, the court held that such evidence
"would be irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the
farm is included in the augmented estate." 33 The court further

126. Id. at 669, 536 S.E.2d at 719.

127. Id.
128.
129.
130.
13L

Id.
Id. at 669-70, 536 S.E.2d at 719.
No. 99-47-01, 2000 WL 890737 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 23, 2000).
Id. at -11.

132. Id.
133. Id. at *2.
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explained that if evidence was offered to show that the farm itself
had been received gratuitously, then the farm would be excluded
from Testatrix's augmented estate pursuant to Virginia Code section 64.1-16.1(B), but "[i]f, however, merely the money which
[Testatrix] used to purchase the farm was 'received'... [gratuitously], then the farm would not be excluded from the augmented
estate." 34 Another way of stating the court's conclusion is that
the exclusion in question extends only to the original gifted property and not to its proceeds.
Although the court quoted from the code section that states the
correct answer to the question before it, the court failed to quote
the controlling provision in its entirety. Two of the words omitted
by the court would have led it to the opposite, and correct, holding
in this case. The relevant provision reads in full as follows:
"Nothing herein shall cause to be included in the augmented es-

tate... (ii) the value of any property, its income orproceeds, received
by the decedent by gift, will, intestate succession, or any other
method or form of transfer to the extent it is received without full
consideration in money or money's worth, before or during the marriage to the surviving spouse... to the extent such property, income,
35
orproceeds were maintained by the decedent as separate property.

B. Augmented Estate-Exclusions-Dateof Transfer
The issue believed to be controlling in In re Estate of
Swecker,"' was whether Decedent conveyed certain farm property to a family partnership before or after August 15, 1987, the
date of his marriage to the surviving spouse who, upon his death,
elected to take her augmented estate rights in his estate. 3 ' This
determination was based upon section 64.1-16.1(A)(3), which includes in a decedent's augmented estate certain tainted transfers
made "during the marriage to the surviving spouse." 38 The surviving spouse argued that the transfer to the family partnership

134. Id. at *1.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(B)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
136. No. 150600, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 361 (Cir. Ct. Aug. 7, 2000) (Fairfax County). This
citation is to the court's opinion letter which is incorporated by reference into the court's
final decree of August 25, 2000, as "Exhibit B." The Report ofthe Special Commissioner in
Chancery, to be referred to later, was incorporated into the final decree as "Exhibit A."
137. See Report of Special Commissioner in Chancery at 5, 7.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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was not made until October 27, 1987, the date the deed in question was recorded, which was more than two months after her
marriage to Decedent." 9 Relying upon the report of the special
commissioner in chancery to whom this matter was referred, the
court held that the farm property in question was transferred after August 14, 1987, and thus was included in Decedent's augmented estate. 4 °
Neither the court nor the commissioner discussed another provision of Virginia's augmented estate law which, if applicable,
would have led to a contrary conclusion. The relevant provision
reads in full as follows: "Nothing herein shall cause to be included
in the augmented estate... (iii) any transfer made to anyone
other than the surviving spouse prior to January 1, 1991, to the
extent that such transfer is irrevocable on that date."' 4 ' Although
Decedent had certain rights in the family partnership to which
the farm property was conveyed, it appears from the facts recited
in the commissioner's report that the conveyance itself was irrevocable on October 27, 1987.142 Further, the law is clear that a
pre-January 1, 1991 irrevocable transfer is excluded from the
transferor's augmented estate even if it is made during the marriage dissolved by the transferor's death.
C. Rule Against Perpetuities-Applicabilityof Correct Version
The issue before the court in Richards v. Maiden,' was the validity of Testatrix's residuary trust created for "the educational
benefit of all of my grandchildren."'45 Testatrix was survived by
four children and three grandchildren, and the court found that,
as she intended to provide for "her present and future born
grandchildren," the residuary trust violated the rule against perpetuities.'46 The court's decision would have been correct if the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities had governed this case,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See Report of Special Commissioner in Chancery at 5-6.
Swecker, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 361, at *1-2.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(B)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
See Report of Special Commissioner in Chancery at 6.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(B)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
No. CH99-17404, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 494 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2000) (Rockingham

County).
145.
146.

Id. at "1.
Id. at *2.
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but it did not. Virginia abandoned the common law "might have
been" rule in favor of a statutory "wait and see" rule in 1982.14
Under a common law "might have been" analysis, the residuary
trust would be void ab initio because of the possibility that a right
might be acquired by an after-born grandchild more that twentyone years following the death of the last life in being at Testatrix's death. However, the governing statutory "wait and see" rule
provides that "a transfer of an interest in property fails, if the interest does not vest, if it ever vests, within the period of the rule
against perpetuities." 45 Under this statutory rule, instead of
making a decision based on future possibilities at the time the
trust becomes irrevocably operative, one waits to see what actually happens during the perpetuity period. 149 If the contingency in
question is in fact resolved before lives in being and twenty-one
years have passed, the interest is deemed valid. 5 ° If the contingency is not resolved within this period, then instead of a declaration of invalidity as under the common law rule, the statutory
rule directs the court to reform the trust under cy pres principles
at that future time.'5 ' Lastly, although the court applied the
common law rule to determine the validity of Testatrix's residuary trust, it applied the statutory cy pres power under section
55-13.3(B) after finding the trust to be void.'52 If the common law
rule had been the governing rule in this case then, upon finding
the residuary trust to be void, the property in question
should
153
have passed to Testatrix's heirs by intestate succession.

147. See Act of Apr. 7, 1982, ch. 249,
§ 55-13.3 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). Although the
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, and
intended to allow one to "opt-out" of the

1982 Va. Acts 399 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
2000 Session adopted a version of the Uniform
an ill-conceived and problem-plagued provision
Rule Against Perpetuities in certain cases, the

1982 "wait and see" rule was retained as the governing rule for "all donative interests created on or after July 1, 1982, and before July 1, 2000." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(B)(i)
(Cum. Supp. 2001). These developments are discussed in Johnson, supra note 2, at 106974. The court's decision does not mention the date of Testatrix's death, but a copy of the
clerk's order probating Testatrix's will states that it was January 31, 1998.
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
149.

See id.

150. See id.
151. Id. A more complete discussion of the 1982 perpetuities legislation can be found in
J. Rodney Johnson, The Transformation of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Virginia,
NEWSLETTER, (T. C. Williams Sch. of Law, Univ. of Richmond, Va.) Oct. 1982, at 10.
152. Richards v. Maiden, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 494, at *4 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2000) (Rockingham County).
153. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that
the 2002 Session of the Virginia General Assembly should (1) correct the drafting errors in the 2001 legislation dealing with notice
and copies of inventories, accountings, and wills,5'T waiver of inventory and settlement in small estates, 55 wrongful death or per56
sonal injury actions against deceased residents or nonresidents,'
and suits by or against personal representatives; 5 (2) repeal the
misbegotten incorporation by reference statute;' and (3) impose
due process notice provisions on testamentary trustees, conservators of incapacitated persons, and guardians of minors that are
comparable to those imposed on personal representatives. 59

154. See supraPart lI.A.
155. See supra Part I..
156. See supraPartU.K.
157. See supra Part H.L.
158. See supra Part I1.H.
159. See supra Part II.A.

